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An Experiment in Team Production·

Abstract
Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) classic paper models team production as a public good.
They claim detection of individual effort levels, rather than aggregate effort levels,
reduces shirking (free riding). This paper experimentally tests this claim. Participants are
informed either about the individual contributions of others on their team or only about
their team's total contribution. Average contributions in the two treatments are the same.
However, contributions under individual feedback have a significantly higher variance
than those under total feedback. Implications of these results for team production are
discussed.

I

Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms:
An Experiment in Team Production

1. Introduction
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) classic paper suggests modeling team production as
a public goods problem. Each team member's effort bas a positive externality on the
other team members. They claim that any costs of monitoring the effort expanded by an
individual on a team will lead to shirking (free riding).

If a worker's "relaxation cannot be detected perfectly at zero cost, part of its effects will
be borne by others in the team, thus making his realized cost of relaxation less than the
true total cost to the team. The difficulty of detecting such actions permits the private
costs of his actions to be less than their full costs. .. [which] implies a lower rate of
productive effort and more shirking than in a costless monitoring, or measuring, world."
(p. 780)
This vision of team production has been extensively developed and explored in the
theoretical literature (Marshak and Radner ( 1972), Holmstrom ( 1982), Holmstrom and
Tirole (1989)).
This paper provides an experimental test of Alchian and Demsetz's original
claims. A public goods problem is induced in the laboratory and the extent of shirking
(free riding) is measured in both of two treatments. In the first, total-feedback treatment,
participants have information only on the total amount contributed to the public good by
the other members of their group. This is analogous to knowing the output or total effort
of one's team (and one's own effort level) but not knowing how much effort each of the
other players have contributed. Shirking thus cannot be detected, much less perfectly and
at zero cost. In the second, individual-feedback treatment, participants are told at the end
of each round how much each individual in their group contributed. This is analogous to
knowing exactly how much effort each individual has contributed to the group product.
Thus shirking can be detected perfectly and at zero cost.'
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The use of the voluntary contribution mechanism to elicit contributions to the
public goods directly mirrors the voluntary nature of expended effort in an employment
situation. Alchian and Demsetz write that "[The firm] . . . has no power of fiat, no
authority , no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary
market contracting between any two people." (p. 777) Workers voluntary choose the
level of effort to expend, as in this mechanism participants voluntarily choose the level of
contributions to make to the group account.
The experiment further captures the team production analogy in that the game is
repeated, but only finitely many times. Like an employment situation, individuals
interact repeatedly and also like an employment situation, the game comes to an end
eventually.
The main result from this study is not consistent with Alchian and Demsetz's
claim. Average contributions are not statistically different between the two feedback
treatments. The variance of contributions in the individual-feedback treatment, however,
is significantly higher than that in the total-feedback treatment. Implications of this result
for team production are discussed in Section 5. 2
This research is of some methodological interest as well. Experimental
economists have studied the public goods problem and the voluntary provision of public
goods extensively (for excellent summaries see Davis and Holt (1993), ch. 6 and Ledyard
(1995)). Although most previous public goods experiments have been run under the
total-feedback condition, some (e.g., Chan, Godby, Mestelman and Muller (1993)) have
been run under individual feedback. Understanding the difference between these two
treatments can help us predict outcomes in these experiments and in their real-life
counterparts more accurately.
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2. Previous Research
Two previous papers have examined the impact of distributional information on
contributions in public goods games. Sell and Wilson (1991) compared three
experimental conditions: individual information, aggregate information and no

information . In the no information condition, participants were told nothing about the
previous round 's results until the entire (ten-round) game had ended. In the aggregate

information treatment, participants were told the total group's investment at the end of
each period. This corresponds to the total-feedback treatment in this study. In the

individual information condition. participants were told the total number of tokens each
individual member had contributed to the public good. This treatment is similar to the
individual-feedback treatment in this study, with one exception. In Sell and Wilson,
members of a participant's group were identified and their contributions recorded over
time. Each participant could thus "trace" each other participant's contributions from
period to period. In this study, the contributions were not associated with any particular
contributor. A participant could thus not directly observe another participant's lowering
or raising his contribution.3
Sell and Wilson find no statistical difference between contributions in the

individual information and aggregate information conditions over all ten periods. These
results are consistent with those presented here. In particular, average contributions
between the individual- and total-feedback treatments do not differ significantly over the
course of the game.4
The variance of contributions observed in this study, however, does differ
between the two treatments. Measures of the spread of individual contributions are not
reponed in Sell and Wilson. Here, contributions in the individual-feedback condition
have a significantly higher variance than those in the total-feedback condition.
Weimann (I 994) also provides participants with information about individual
contributions (as well as about individual earnings) and compares their decisions with
4

those of participants provided with information only about total contributions. He also
concludes that average contributions do not change with the additional information. No
information about the spread of individual contributions is reported.

3. Experimental Procedure and Design
This study used a voluntary contribution mechanism to elicit public goods
provision. For each treatment, 24 participants (in two groups of 12) were recruited from
economics classes in the University of Arizona summer session. Participants were
randomly assigned to groups of four, remaining in the same group for the entire
experiment. In each round they were endowed with 25 tokens, which could be placed
either into a private account or into a group account but could not be saved for use in
future rounds. Tokens are thus analogous to time which can be spent on leisure or on
expanding effort. In a similar way hours cannot be saved for use the next day. Subjects
were compensated in dollars for tokens (time) spent in a private account (on leisure) and
in a public account (on effort). The experiments lasted a finite number of rounds.
The conditions under which this procedure will induce a public goods problem are
simple to illustrate. Assume each player i in a group of N identical players has some
endowment E, which can either be c.ontributed to a group account and used to produce
units of a public good (analogous to expending effort) or can be privately consumed and
converted to cash (analogous to shirking or consuming leisure). Call the amount
contributed to the group account by i, x,. The individual's earnings from private
consumption (leisure) is simply the amount consumed (E,- x,). The individual's earnings
from contributions to the group account is a function of the sum of contributions by all
participants P(L;x,). The group's earnings is the sum of the individual earnings and the
payouts from the group account L;(E,- x,) + NP(!:,x,). Each individual chooses x, to
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maximize his earnings ((E,- X;) + P~)). We say there is a (pure) public goods problem
when two conditions are satisfied.
Condition 1: Contributions to the private account are individually optimal.
(1)

Thus regardless of the contributions of the other players, player i never wants to
contribute to the group account This is analogous to assuming that an individual prefers
to shirk than to work in the absence of any punishment Were this not the case there
would be no need for any sort of monitoring-all individuals would work because they
preferred to do so.
Condition 2: Contributions to the private account are not optimal for the group.
NP'~)

> 1 'v'x., 'v'x.,

1

P'~X;) > N

(2)

'v'x., 'v'x.,

Regardless of the contributions of the other players the group as a whole earns more when
player i contributes to the group account than when he contributes to the private account
This is analogous to assuming that the team as a whole produces more than an individual's
value ofleisure when an individual expands effort. Were this not the case it would be
socially optimal for all workers to engage in leisure rather than in expanding effort
The payoff per token for the private account in this study was 2¢ to the private and
for the group account was 1¢ to each member of the group. With a group size of 4 we can
confmn that both conditions (1) and (2) above are satisfied. Condition (1) suggests that
each individual prefers to contribute each marginal token to the private account (earning
2¢) than to the group account (earning I¢). Condition (2) suggests that the group as a
whole is better off when each individual contributes his marginal token to the group
account (which earns 4¢ for the group--!¢ for each of four members) than when he
contributes his marginal token to the private account (which earns 2¢ only for him).
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There were two games lasting ten rounds each. Participants were initially told
they would play a game of ten rounds. At the end of the ten rounds, they were told
(unexpectedly) that there was just enough time to restan the game and to play another ten
rounds. This technique has been used previously to simulate a "new game" (Andreoni
(1988)) or in this setting, a new task with the same team members. The first ten rounds
(the first game) and the second ten rounds (the restart game) are reported separately.
This study was completely computerized. Participants signed in, collected their
show-up fee and sat at a computer terminal. The instructions were given via the
computer screen and participants typed their contribution decisions on the keyboard.
Participants played three practice rounds (for which they earned no money) to familiarize
themselves with the setup of the computer. 6 Participants were paid a five dollar show-up
fee plus their earnings in the experiment Each session lasted around an hour and
participants earned on average $13.97 along with the show-up fee.
At the end of each round in the total-feedback treatment, participants saw their
own earnings, the total number of tokens the other three members of their group had
contributed to the public good and the group's total contribution. In the individualfeedback treatment, participants saw the individual contributions of the other three
members of their group in increasing order of contribution, as well as their own earnings
and the total contributed. In contrast to Sell and Wilson, here individual contributions
were not identified with their contributor. Weimann does not describe the level of
identification available in his setting. 7
When a game such as this one, which includes a pure public goods problem, is
played once there is a unique dominant strategy equilibrium in which all players fully

free ride (fully shirk). When the game is repeated finitely many times (with endowments
expiring at the end of each period), contributing zero in all periods is the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. These strong equilibrium predictions are, however, not typically
observed.

7

4. Experimental Results

A. Feedback Treatment
Of primary interest is the difference in contributions between the two feedback
(monitoring) conditions. Overall, average contributions in the two treatments were
statistically indistinguishable. 8 Over all periods in the first game there are no significant
differences between treatments in average contributions. Over all periods in the restart game,
contributions are significantly different between treatments at the 5% level. If we pool
average contribution levels over both games, there is no statistical difference in contributing
behavior between the two treatments. These results are described in Table 1 below.9

Insert Table 1 here

Figure 1 shows the average participant contribution in each treatment over ten
first rounds and ten restart rounds. The average contributions in each treatment are very
close, except at the end of the second ten rounds where they diverge.

Insert Figure 1 here

Although there is no statistical difference in average contributions between the
two treatments overall, the variances of these contributions differ greatly. There is
significantly more variation in group contributions under the individual-feedback
condition. 10 That the variances of contributions differ between treatments can be tested
with an F-test. Table 2 reportS variances of average group contributions in each period.

8
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Insert Table 2 here

An F-test on contributions between treatments within each game and over both games

combined, reports significantly more variation under individual feedback than under total
feedback. The results of these F-tests are depicted in Table 3. 11

Insert Table 3 here

These high variances under the individual-feedback condition seem to come from
each group developing its own norm of contribution (or effort) level. Implications of a
group effort-norm on team production will be discussed in section 5.
The variance of contributions within each group is not significantly greater under
individual feedback than under total feedback . The variance of contributions between
groups, however, is significantly greater under individual feedback than under total. A
comparison in Figures 2 and 3 of the spread of average group contributions shows this
variance.

Insert Figures 2 and 3 here

Finally, we can look at the proportion of free riders (participants contributing zero
tokens or shirking) and of full contributors (participants contributing all 25 tokens) in
each treatment. Table 4 compares the incidence of free riding in the two treatments and
Table 5 examines the incidence of full contribution. If the proportions of players free
9

riding and fully contributing are pooled over both games, these proportions are
significantly different at the I% level between treatments (t= ll.27 for free riders, t=-5.05
for full contributors). 1z

Insert Tables 4 and 5 here

There is always at least as much free riding and full contributing in the individualfeedback treatment as in the total-feedback treatment. This result is consistent with the
higher variance of contributions in the individual-feedback condition seen in Table 3.

B. Learning
Of secondary interest is the amount of learning exhibited by participants in this
experiment between the first and the restart games. If learning were found it may suggest
that workers learn to shirk less (or more) as they engage in more team production.
However. behavior in the restart game was similar to that of the first under both
conditions. In fact, the distribution of contributions in a given round was
indistinguishable from the distribution of contributions in that same-numbered restarted
round, with one exception. 13
A more powerful statistical test uses a blocking technique to distinguish between
contributions in the first game (the first 10 rounds) and contributions in the restart game
(the second 10 rounds). Here, the total-feedback treatment shows some evidence of
decreasing contribution levels over the two games (more shirking), but there is no such
evidence for the individual-feedback treatment. 14

5. Conclusion
This srudy experimentally tests and rejects Alchian and Demsetz's original
hypothesis that if individual contributions to team production were known, shirking
10

would decrease. Individual contributions to a public good in the lab are the same under
both feedback conditions; total feedback about the group's aggregate effort levels and
individual feedback detailing how much each member of the group contributed. This
result replicates those found under similar informational conditions reported in Sell and
Wilson and in Weimann.
However, the variance of the contributions between the two treatments differs
significantly. A much higher proportion of participants fully shirk (free ride) under
individual feedback than under total feedback. More participants fully contribute under
the individual-feedback condition as well. The higher variance in contributions is driven
not by more variance within each group, but by more variance berween groups. The
average group contributions under individual fe.edback are more varied than they are
under total feedback.
This difference in variance has some important implications for incentive and
compensation schemes in team production. More available and detailed information on
who is contributing what to the output of the team will not necessarily raise the average
contribution or effort expanded. It will, however, raise the variance of output between
teams. In a production process where one team 's outputs are other team's inputs this
increased variance could be extremely costly. In processes where teams operate
relatively independently, the increased variance may be irrelevant.
This high variance suggests there may be some (hidden) characteristics of teams
which lead them either to shirking or cooperating. Without knowing in advance which
team has which characteristics, a planner cannot know how an individual team will react
to the additional information. More research is clearly needed to understand the
development of these group norms which will enable us to estimate a team's reaction to a
change in information.
These results have implications for experimental methodology as well.
Researchers often compare outcomes between experiments to draw general conclusions.
II

This study suggests that results from public goods experiments run under different
feedback conditions might look the same in terms of average contributions. Despite this
observational equivalence, the distributions generating those averages may be
significantly different. Statistical tests comparing contributions between experiments
should be carefully selected to be consistent with this difference. 15

12
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Endnotes
The author thanks Jon Baron, David Croson, Jerry Green, Mark Isaac, Eric Maskin, Jeff
Prisbrey, Jane Sell and George Wu for helpful comments. All omissions or mistakes are
the responsibility of the author. Funding of experiments from Economic Science Lab at
the University of Arizona is gratefully acknowledged
'These two types of feedback mechanisms are used in fundraising efforts as well. A
counterpart to the total-feedback treatment is the giant thermometer often seen in
fundraising drives. The readings at the thermometer's top indicate the drive's
fundraising goal and thermometer is filled to the level of money already raised. This
provides information about the rora/ others have contributed to the effort, but no
information about the size and distribution of individual contributions. A counterpart to
the individual-feedback treatment can be seen on the backs of theater playbooks.
Contributions are typically divided into categories by amount (Patron, Friend,
Benefactor, etc.). A potential contributor can see how many others have contributed
(approximately) how much to the effort.
2

The experiment reported in this paper uses a fixed compensation scheme and changes
the level of information available to the participants. For an excellent evaluation of
various incentive and compensation schemes with the same levels of information see
Nalbantian and Schotter (1994).

3

In Sell and Wilson's design, two factors were confounded in the comparison between
individual and aggregate information; (I) knowing individual feedback versus total
feedback and (2) knowing how an individual's contribution changed over time (by
tracing his contributions period-to-period) versus knowing only how the total group
contribution (minus your own) changed over time. Under this paper's procedure,
participants cannot trace an individual's contribution over time in either of the conditions,
making the comparison between treatments a measure of only the feedback and not of the
additional information. The similarity of the results between the two studies suggests that
this particular distinction was irrelevant.
4

By aggregating the contributions only over the last five periods of the game (a somewhat
arbitrary choice), Sell and Wilson demonstrate that participants in the individual infonnarion
condition comribute more than participants in the aggregate infonnation condition.
5

P'(S;x,)) is often called the marginal per capita return (MPCR) and is the marginal return
on contributions to the group account.

6

Data from practice rounds and copies of instructions are available from the author.

7

Since the individual contributions were displayed in increasing order rather than in the
order of participant number, participants could not identify how much (or whether) a
group member's contribution had changed in consecutive rounds.
~n only one of the twenty periods of the game (period nine of the restart game), average

contributions differ. Contributions in the other periods are not significantly different.
14

~he Wilcoxon statistic tests the hypothesis that two sets of data were generated from the

same underlying distribution. For each period, independent observations (average group
contributions n==6 m=6) were compared. For each game, average group contributions for
all ten periods were tested using the large sample approximation version of the test (n=60
m=60). Over both games togerher (n=l20 m=J20) the Wilcoxon test with large sample
approximation could not reject the hypothesis that the data were generated from the same
underlying distribution at the 5% level (z=J.S7 p=.I IS7).
10

Group contributions in each round are independent observations as members of one
group never interacted with members of another. Some groups achieved rhe pareto
optimal solution of full contribution in the individual-feedback condition in all but rhe
last few rounds of each game.
11

The F-test results reported here pooled the average group contributions for each period
over each game and over both games. In each game n=60 m=60 (6 groups for 10
periods). In borh games n==l20 m==l20.
12

The t-test used here testS the similarity of two proportions. If Pi is rhe proportion of
free riders (alternately, full contributors) in treatment i and ni is the number of
observations in the treatment then
p, - p
p, (l- p,)/ + p, (1- p, )/

t=-r~--~~~~~~

;In,

Jfn:

Here, ni for each individual period is 24 individual contributions. Over each game, 240
observations were used (24 contributions in each of 10 periods). Over borh games, 480
observations were used.
13

Using a 2-sided Wilcoxon test on individual contributions, we cannot reject at 5% level
the hypoThesis that contributions in round i of the first game are the same as contributions
in round i of the restart game with one exception: total feedback first round 7 and restart
round 7 are different at rhe 5% level.
1

"The blocking technique looks at the differences between each participant's contribution
in period i of the first game and period i of the restart game fori= I, 2, ... ! 0. Then it tests
wherher rhe distribution of rhese d ifferences is significantly different from zero. In the
total-feedback treatment, rhe distribution of these differences was significantly positive
(z=S.ll, p<.Ol), suggesting that participants contributed Jess in the restart game than they
had in the first game. In the individual-feedback treatment, however, this distribution is
not distinguishable from zero at any level of significance (z=.30, p>.2).
15

Weimann (1 994) is an excellent case-in-point. The author compares two experimental
treatments wirh differing feedback on the basis of their means, concludes that there is no
statistical difference between the treatments and proceeds to pool the data without
examining rhe variances of the observations.
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Table 1
Average In vestment in Public Good per Subject

Total
Individual
Differettce
Restart Total
Restart Individual
Difference

Rnund
I
13.96
16.50
-2.54

2
12.83
13.7 1
-0.88

3
11.42
12.67
-1.25

4
12.33
12.33
0.00

5
12.33
11.63
0.71

6
11.88
11.67
0.21

7
9.92
8.38
1.54

8
7.79
8.38
-0.58

9
9.04
8.42
0.63

10
4.54
6.42
- 1.88

Both
10.60
11.01
-0.40

11.54
13. 13
-1.58

11.33
11.7 1
-0.38

10.29
10.58
-0.29

7.88
9.88
-2.00

7.33
9.42
-2.08

6.88
12.00
-5.13

4.21
11.33
-7.13

6.50
9.54
-3.04

4.25
12. 13
-7.88.

2.67
7.83
-5.17

7.29
10.75
-3.47

*different at the 5% level (two-sided Wilcoxon test)

All

Games

8.95
I 0.88
- 1.94

*

Total
Individual
Difference

Table 2
Variance of Average Group Contributions

Round
Total
Individua l
Difference

I
51.06
28.25
22.8 1

2
66.47
38.94
27.53

3
35.57
73.04
-37.48

4
13.54
58.59
-45.05

5
16.62
74.39
-57 78

6
43.79
62.44
-18.65

7
14.14
74.72
-60.58

8
44.09
78.87
-34.78

32.34
33.69
-136

10
13.36
26. 17
- 12.8 1

Rcstan Total
Restart Individual
Difference

32.34
26.17
6.17

13.36
65.32

38.24
80.36
-42.13

37.82
66.39
-28.58

43.94
67.99
-24.06

43. 14
6322
-20.07

2 1.42
76.03
-54.61

25.77
73.14
-47.37

10.64
94.64
-84.00

13.33
43.59
-30.27

-51.96
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Table 3
F-Tes t Results on Average G•·ou1> ContrihuCions
Total versus Individual Feedback
Original Game
F(59,59)

= 1.56

p = 0.046

Re.~tart

Game

F(59,59) = 1.97

p = 0.005

Both Games
F( I 19,I 19) = 1.61

p

= 0.005

Table 4
P.-oporlion of Free Riders

Round
Total
Individual
Difference

0.08
0.08
0.00

2
0.08
0.2 1
-0.13

Restart Total
Restart Individual
Diffcrcnce

0.04
0.29
-0.25

0.04
0.33
-0.29

I

*

**

*different at the 5% level (two-sided t-test)
**different at the I% level (two-sided t-test)

3
0.04
0.25
-0.21

0.04
0.42
-0.38 **

*

4
0.04
0.21
-0.17

0.08
0.2 1
-0.13

6
0.04
0.38
-0.33

0.13
0.38
-0.25 •

0.04
0.42
-0.38

0.04
0.33
-0.29

5

**

**

7
0.00
0.46
-0.46

**

8
0.04
0.29
-0.25

**

0.04
0.33
-0.29 **

0. 17
0.46
-0.29

*

9
0.04
0.42
-0.38

*

0.13
0.33
-0.21

**

10
0.13
0.63
-0.50 **

All
0.06
0.31
-0.25 **

0.13

0.08
0.38
-0.30

0.50

-0.38

**

**

Table 5
Proportion of Full Contributors

Total
Ind ividual
Difference
Restart Total
Restart Individual
Difference

Round
I
0.33
046
-0.13

2
0.29
0.29
0.00

3
0.25
0.38
-0.13

4
0.29
0.29
0.00

5
0.25
0.29
-0.04

6
0.21
0.33
-0.13

7
0.08
0.21
-0. 13

8
0.17
0.17
0.00

9
0.21
0 .2 1
0.00

10
0.04
0.13
-0.08

All
0.2 1
0.28
-0.06

0.2 1
0.38
-0. 17

0.2 1
0.29
-0.08

0.13
0.25
-0.13

0.08
0.29
-0.2 1

0.08
0.25
-0. 17

0.04
0.33
-0.29

0.04
0.29
-0.25

0.08
0.29
-0.21

0.04
0.38
-0.33

0.04
0.25
-0.2 1 *

0.10
0.30
-0.20

*different at the 5% level (two-sided t-test)
**different at the I% level (two-sided t-test)

**

*

**

**

Figure 1
Average Contributions
under Varying Feedback Conditions
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Figure 2
Maximum, Minimum and Average Group Contributions
under Total Feedback
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Figure 3
Maximum, Minimum and Average Group Contributions
under Individual Feedback

25

20

~ 15

~...

..
..8
0

J

. 10

s

0

I

2

1

-1-

5

6

7

8

9

10

Period#

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Attached please find a set of screen print-outs which illustrate the
instructions presented to the subjects for each of the treatments of
this experiment. These instructions are to be used to aid in the
reviewing process and are not intended for publication.

•

C.:>:_t

This is station u 1
Welcome to an
Economic Experiment
This is an exper il•ent in the eronoooics of group decision
naking. Various research agencies haue prouided the funds for
conducting this research. If you follow the instructions and ll4ke
good decisions you nay earn a considerable a.ount of ADney which
will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiaent. Feel
free to make as much money as you can.
We will require some personal data
information is kept confidential.
11...----~-----11,

for record

Press PgDn to continue

keeping. All

.n--=====----

Design
: Arlington Llilliams, Antoni Bosch, Isabel Sanchez
Progranming : Shawn LaMaster. Jordi nas. Zaca Sanchez
Uniuersitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona a Uniuersidad Carlos III, Madrid
Copyright<Cl 1991

Conputer Research

a

Consulting

Tucson, Arizona

Please enter the following information.

Your Hame : croson
Your Social Security Humber : 111-11-1111
Your Telephone Humber : 999-9999

16.- --==----11

Press PgDn to continue

.11----==== --.u

Design
: Arlington Williams, Antoni Bo.s ch, Isabel sanchez
Progrann i ng : Shaun Lallaster. Jord i Mas. Zaca sanchez
Uniuersitat Ponpeu fabra, Barcelona a Uniuersidad Carlos III. Madrid
Copyrlght (C) 1991
Period :

2

Computer Research

Decision St4ge

a Consulting

<Practice Period)

Tucson, Arizona

This is an experiment in the economics of gr oup decision maki11g. The
experilllent ~ill last 2 periods . You have been randomly assigned to a
particular group of 1 people (6 other people plus yourself). The ~hers
of your group ~ill not change throughout the experiment.
In the beginning of each period you and every other member of the group
uill be endo~ed with 25 "tokens". In each period you must decide }lQI;I to
diuide your tokens betueen a PRIUATE ACCOUNT and a GROUP ACCOUNT. Each
person in the group has a PRIUATE ACCOUNT and is making a siRilar
.decision. Howeuer, there is only one GROUP ACCOUNT for the entire group.
In each period you will earn 2 cents for each token placed in your
PRIUATE ACCOUNT. Thus, if you choose to place all of your tokens in your
PRIVATE ACCOUNT you would earn <25 x 2) = 56 cents in that period.
In each period you and euery other member of the group will earn 1 cent
for each token placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT. All members of the group can
place tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT.
Before making your decision you will have an opportunity to review the
past decisions of your group by pressing FS.
Your cash earnings for the experiment "'i ll be the sum of your profits
from the GROUP ACCOUNT and fro"' your PRIUATE ACCOUNT. There will be 2
practi ce periods before you begin the actual experir:1ent. The practice
periods uill familiarize you with the computer progran. You will not be
paid for the practice periods.

= = = ===== - - -=91 Press PgDn to continue

Ill============='~

Press the R key to see the instructions again.
Press the Q key to su01100n an assistant if you
haue questions. Otherwise, please be patient
until the other players are ready.
Waiting for others to finish . . .

£ueryone is nou ready to begin. Before starting the
experiMent there will be 2 practice periods. The practice
periods will help you beco01e fa01iliar ~lth the co01puter
progra01. You will not be paid for the practice periods. After
the practice periods, the actual experinent will begin and
uill last 2 periods. The noney earned during the actual
experi01ent will be yours to keep.
Good luck.

~--------========9,1

Press PgDn to continue

.~--==============~

Period:
~ou

1 Decision Stage

(Practice Period)

have 25 tokens to divide between the PRIUAT£ and GROUP ACCOUNTS.

For each token that you place in the PRIUATE ACCOUNT you will receive
2 cents.
For each token that each member of the group (including yourself) places
in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and every other member of the group will receive
1 cent.
How rnany tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? - >2
You have decided to place 2 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period.
You uill place the reoaining 23 tokens in your PRIUATE ACCOUNT this period.
Press FlO to confirm, or press any other key to change your decision

Results of Period:

1

(Practice Period)

Total number of tokens in the GROUP ACCOUiiT
Nunber of tokens others placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT
Your earnings fran the PRIUATE ACCOUNT
Your earnings from the GROUP ACCOUNT

u...------= = =l,l Press any key to continue

,

3 tokens
9 tokens

44.9 cents
3.9 cents

.~t--=====---...11

The practice periods haue ended. Press F5 to reuiew the history of
the practice periods. Press any other key to continue to the actual
experiment.

I Press

FS to reuiew the history Press any other key to continue

Period:

2

Decision Stage

(Practice Period)

You have 25 tokens to divide between the PRIVATE and GROUP ACCOUNTS.
For each token that you place in the PRIUATE ACCOUNT you will receive
2 cents.
For each token that each ne~ber of the group (including yourself) places
in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and every other ~e~ber of the group uill r eceive
1 cent.
To help with your decision, you ~ay want to look at the history of past
decisions of this group. To see the history of pas t decisions press FS.
Ho~ ~any

tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? ->5

You have decided to place 5 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period.
You will place the renaining 26 tokens in your PRIUATE ACCOUNT this period.
Press FlO to

confir~.

or press any other key to change your decision

Nou ue

uill begin
the actual experi~ent . The
will las t 2 periods. The ~oney you earn fro~
now on will be yours to keep, so ~ake your decisions
carefully.
experi~ent

"=~~======l,l

Press any key to continue

1,1==~-~==...a

Period:

1 Decision Stage

You haue 25 tokens to diuide betwee n the PRIVATE and GROUP ACCOUNTS.
For each token that you place in the PRIVATE ACCOUNT you will receiue
2 cents.
For each token that each ~e~ber of the group (including yourself) places
in the GROUP ACCOUNT you and euery other member of the group will receiue
1. cent.
How

~any

tokens do you want to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? ->3

You haue decided to place 3 tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT this period.
You uill place the re~aining 22 tokens in your PRIVATE ACCOUNT this period.
Press f16 to

confir~.

or press any other key to change your decision

History of results
Your
tokens

---------eriod

GROUP
ACCNT

PRIVATE
ACCNT

Others
tokens

Total

GROUP
ACCNT

GROUP
ACCNT

-- - -

Earnings
fro~

GROUP
ACCNT

PRIVATE
ACCNT

TOTAL
EARNINGS

============================================================================
1

2

3
8

22
17

e

e

3
8

s e.e3
s e.e8

$ 6.44
$ 9.34

---~===ll Press any key to return to the experiment

$ 9.47

s e.42

11===- - - -...u

The exper i"'ent has ended. Press FS to reu iew the history of
the experinent. Press any other key to end the prograA and to
collect your noney.

I Press

FS to reuiew the history

I

I

Press any other key to end

Congratulations!

~ou

You haue earned 9.81

haue reached the end of the exercise.
dollars.

Please remain in your seat quietly until your name is called.
Thank you for your participation.

History of results
'lour
tokens

------GROUP
•eriod ACCHT

PRIVATE
ACCHT

Others
tokens

Total

GROUP
ACCHT

GROUP
ACCHT

Earnings
fi'OII

GROUP
ACCHT

PRIVATE
ACCHT

TOTAL
EAR111HGS

=============================================================================
1

2

1
1

24
24

995, 681, - 5882 1
-39,7986, -293 1

$ 9.91
$ 9.91

Press any key to return to the

$ 9.48
$ 9.48

$ 9.49.
$ 9.49

experi~nt 1~----==---=-.--D

This is an experiment in the economics of group decision making. The
experiment will last 2 periods. You haue been randomly assigned to a
particular group of 1 people (9 other people plus yourself). The ~bers
of your group will not change throughout t he exper iment .
In the beginning of each period you and euery other member of the group
will be endowed with 25 "tokens". In each period you must decide ho111 to
divide your tokens between a PRIVATE ACCOUNT and a GROUP ACCOUNT. Each
person in the group has a PRIVATE ACCOUNT and is making a siMilar
.decision. However, there is only one GROUP ACCOUNT for the entire group.
In each period you will earn 2 cents for each t oken placed in your
PRIUATE ACCOUNT. Thus, if you choose to place all of your tokens in your
PRIUATE ACCOUNT you would earn czs x 2) = sa cents in that period.
In each period you and euery other member of the group will earn 1 cent
for each token placed in the GROUP ACCOUNT. All •embers of the group can
place tokens in the GROUP ACCOUNT.
Before making your decision you will haue an opportunity to
past decisions of your group by pressing rs.

reuie.~

the

Your cash earnings for the experiMent will be the sun of your profits
fro• the GROUP ACCOUNT and from your PRIUATE ACCOUNT. There will be 2
practice periods before you begin the actual experiloent. The practice
periods will familiarize you with the c001puter progrll.l!o. You will not be
paid for the practice periods.

= = ===== = = ==II Press PgDn to continue 11===========:!1

Results or Period:

1

(Practice Period)

Total number or tokens in the GROUP ACCOUHT
Humber of tokens placed in the GROUP ACCOUHT by the
other a Jllelllbers of the group (increasing order)
9?32
Your earnings fro111 the PRIVATE ACCOUHT
Your earnings fro~~~ the GROUP ACCOUHT

1!...------==-ll.

GROUP PRIVATE
Period ACCrlt ACCHT

24263 , - 7215,
48 .6 cents
1.9 cents

Press any Jcey to continue .a--------~

- - - - - - - - - History of results
Your
t okens

1 token

Others
tokens

Total

GROUP

GROUP

ACOtT

(Practice

Session)=======----~

Earnings

AC01J

fro..
GROUP

PRIVATE

ACOtt

ACOtt

TOTAL
EARHIHGS

=============================================================================
1
2

21
21

1
1

212. 3-72.59?32 1
-11,8- 15.22661? 1

$ 6 .81
$ 6 .91

$ 8.48
$ 8.48

$ 8.19
$ 9 .19

I

I

'-===~---ll

Press any key to return to t he experiment

jll-===~--...a

